

The War for Southern Independence

Part 4

Civil War

MOVERS

&

SHAKERS

Table of Contents

- 4004 [Introduction](#)
- 4101 [Ulysses S Grant](#)
- 4106 [Jefferson Davis](#)
- 4109 [Robert E Lee](#)
- 4111 [George B McClellan](#)
- 4118 [William Tecumseh Sherman](#)
- 4122 [Thomas Jonathan \(Stonewall\) Jackson](#)
- 4126 [James Longstreet](#)
- 4133 [Nathan Bedford Forrest](#)
- 4138 [A P Hill](#)
- 4141 [George H Thomas](#)
- 4144 [Wade Hampton](#)
- 4149 [Philip Sheridan](#)
- 4153 [J E B \(Jeb\) Stuart](#)
- 4156 [George Armstrong Custer](#)
- 4158 [Alexander Stephens](#)
- 4159 [Richard Taylor](#)

Introduction¹

We know quite a bit of what Abraham Lincoln (AL) said and did. But it's interesting and informative to also take a look at what some of the other principle Civil War characters said and did. What kind of people were they? How did they really feel about blacks, slavery, secession, the Constitution, and the war? What made them tick? Does it really matter what generals thought about the war? They didn't set policy, AL did. Yes, it matters because military officers, as well as the President, are required to swear an oath to uphold the Constitution. Did they uphold the Constitution? What great cause(s) did they believe they were fighting for?

¹ CWC, p95-327

Ulysses S Grant (Union General)²:

Gen Grant was the North's military hero of the Civil War, and later he became President (POTUS). Before the war, in response to a friend's suggestion that the South was more bark than bite, Grant said:

There is a good deal of bluster; that's a product of their education; but once they get at it they will make a strong fight. You are a great deal like them in one respect -- each side underestimates the other and over-estimates itself.

He had a pretty good idea what to expect in the war, and he had a pretty effective strategy for dealing with it: go straight at the enemy, and don't stop. According to one of his soldiers, **Ulysses don't scare worth a damn**. He came to be so fearless when he realized early on in battle that the enemy is at least as afraid as he is. But his battle philosophy was also a product of superstition.

One of my superstitions had always been when I started to go anywhere, or to do anything, not to turn back, or stop until the thing intended was accomplished.

He refused to accept even the possibility of defeat, in part because he knew the Union had sufficient resources to make victory all but inevitable. All he had to do to win was keep fighting, because he knew the South would eventually run out of men and resources before he did. It was simply a job that had to be done, and Grant wasn't about to stop until it was finished, no matter how many men were killed in the process.

The only way to whip an army is to go straight out and fight it.

² CWC, p199-221

Grant's stubborn determination to fight on to ultimate victory, no matter the cost, was indeed costly. It's not that he didn't care about his fallen men. At the Battle of Ft Donelson, he was deeply moved by the scene of wounded and dead soldiers. He was prompted to utter these lines from *Man Was Made to Mourn*, a Robert Burns poem:

*Man's inhumanity to man
Makes countless thousands mourn.*

Grant no doubt mourned, but not so much that it prevented him from vigorously participating in man's inhumanity to man. And his willingness to sacrifice untold thousands of lives led to his reputation in the North as a *butcher*. However, that criticism was probably misplaced. Grant was only doing his job, and he had the job because so many Union generals before him had been unable or unwilling to do it. The real butcher was AL. The blood of 650,000 Americans was on Lincoln's hands.

Although Grant was relentless in battle, he was magnanimous in victory. He acknowledged that Robert E Lee was a good commander, but Grant was not intimidated by him. When Lee surrendered, Grant got so caught up in military chit-chat that he had almost forgotten what their meeting was about. But Lee hadn't. Lee would not allow his men to speak ill of Grant, reminding them of the generous terms of surrender.

Born Hiram Ulysses Grant, his name evolved into Ulysses S Grant by mistake. When he received his appointment to West Point, his first name disappeared, and his mother's maiden name Simpson was inserted. Grant never bothered to correct the error, maybe because he was too shy, or maybe because he liked his new name better. His initials, US, then evolved into *Uncle Sam*. And that's how that got started.

Grant firmly believed that slavery was wrong. He had one slave of his own, but he freed him shortly after he had acquired him. He preferred to hire freed blacks, and he was

willing to pay them more than the going rate. The woman he married owned a few slaves, so Grant became their master as part of the package, but that did not alter his anti-slavery stance, and he would not tolerate cruelty to slaves.

Slavery, to Grant, was not a major issue in the war. But it became an issue he had to deal with in states like Kentucky, Missouri, and Union-occupied Tennessee. Both pro-Union and pro-Confederate families owned slaves in those areas, and Grant was forced to decide what to do with those families, their slaves, and runaways.

My inclination is to whip the rebellion into submission, preserving all constitutional rights [including the right to slavery]. If it cannot be whipped in any other way than through a war against slavery, let it come to that legitimately.

His policy became one of imposing penalties on slave-owning families. But only Confederate families. Union slave-owning families were left alone. An example of such penalties was the confiscation of a large house in Memphis. The house was used by Grant and his family, while its Confederate-sympathizing owner was sent to prison. Runaway slaves were not returned to their owners, but they weren't freed, either. They were forced to work in the Union cause. They were still slaves, just with a Union master.

The original Uncle Sam had been involved in the Mexican War, and in his mind it was related to the Civil War. The Mexican War had resulted from the occupation of Texas, then its secession from Mexico, and finally its annexation by the US. It had all been a conspiracy to acquire more territory for slavery. And the Southern rebellion, then, had been largely the result of the Mexican War.

He felt both wars were unholy, and they were both punishment for American transgressions. He had fought in the Mexican War, however, because he figured he had no business trying to interfere with any war his nation engaged in, whether it was right or wrong. He considered the South's struggle for independence unholy, but in that case

it was not only his duty to fight like a good soldier -- he considered stopping secession a righteous cause.

As strange as that logic may be, what is most important about it is what is missing from it. Nowhere in his thinking did the Declaration of Independence (DOI), or the Revolutionary War, or the Constitution (COTUS) seem to factor in. It was as if all that had never taken place, and if acknowledged at all, it was to simply be ignored. Although Grant, like other officers and elected officials, took an oath to uphold COTUS, no one in the Union seemed to take that seriously. It's not that they sincerely believed secession was unconstitutional or illegal, or that they ever even considered it an appropriate question to ask. It's just that they felt secession was wrong, and they had the military might to force their point of view on the Confederacy.

That is the tragedy of the War for Southern Independence. The North was determined to prevent the South from exercising its natural right of secession, a right which superseded even COTUS. It set America back centuries to prerevolutionary days when the law of the land, every land, was might-makes-right. That is the noble principle for which AL destroyed 650,000 American lives, including thousands of defenseless, innocent women, children, old men, and the very blacks Yankees were supposedly busy liberating. AL demolished half the country, shredded COTUS, and set himself up as a dictator. Not to preserve the Union, not to free the slaves, but simply to enforce Southern collection of tariff revenue to which Yankees had become addicted.

It is only in light of that that the irony of the following can be truly appreciated. In Dec 1862 Gen Grant issued his General Order No 11:

The Jews, as a class, violating every regulation of trade established by the Treasury Department, and also Department [of the Tennessee] orders, are hereby expelled from the Department [of the Tennessee].

Jews who did not leave were subject to arrest, and many were arrested. The order was not well received in Washington, and it was quickly rescinded, but it forever tarnished Grant's reputation.

In spite of appearances, however, Grant was not an anti-Semite. It wasn't Jews he hated, but greed, and greedy people. He despised people who placed commerce above country. How tragic that he could not see that that was exactly what the Union was doing in the Civil War. He was helping perpetuate the very greed he loathed.

It is also supremely ironic that greed destroyed his presidency. And that greed led to his bankruptcy. He had been swindled out of all his savings.

Unfortunately, it wasn't only Grant who paid the price for his actions. More than any other Union general, Grant made AL's unholy war a Yankee success. The harm done to America is extensive, severe, and, for the most part, irreparable.

Jefferson Davis (President of the Confederacy):³

Jefferson Davis objected to the phrase *the extension of slavery* because it was very misleading. The South had worked hard to suppress the slave trade, and they had no desire to reopen it. They didn't want to increase the number of slaves. What they wanted was the freedom to take their existing slaves with them into new territories. Davis believed that this would, in fact, help achieve abolition faster, because it would widely disperse the slaves into areas where slavery would not be viable.

Davis treated his slaves very well, and he attempted to prepare them for eventual freedom. For example, he educated them in the ways of civilized society by instituting a system of slave laws and courts. In this slave legal system, Davis could pardon a convict, but he could not increase the punishment set by the slave jury.

Davis' vision of slavery was one in which slaves were well cared for -- physically, morally, and spiritually. They were contented, happy, and healthy. It was a period of preparation, so that slaves would be ready to take on the *pursuit of happiness* as free men when the time came. One elderly slave said of Jefferson Davis: **I loved him, and I can say that every colored man he ever owned loved him.** Davis considered it quite possible that, when the time came, slaves would actually object to being freed by their masters. (Some did).

Nevertheless, they would be freed in due course, and that prospect should be facilitated, in Davis' view, by the force of Christianity, not by military force. After all, slavery had ended in the North when it was no longer economically viable, and the same process would play out in the South, just at a slower pace. As it turned out, however, the pace and method were set by the North.

³ SRK, p103-105

All we ask is to be let alone. That's what Jefferson Davis said, and what the South wanted. Was that really too much to ask? Apparently.

But what about Ft Sumter? Doesn't that prove that Davis and the South were itching for a fight? Absolutely not. That was a Union fort in the heart of the Confederacy. The North had to turn it over to the South, and AL knew it. Most other forts and other federal territory in the South had been turned over. But the North had refused the Confederacy's offer to pay for Sumter, and even to pay the South's share of the national debt. AL goaded the South into firing first so he would have some political cover for his illegal, immoral war. The South didn't want war, but when it was inevitable, they were not going to back down.

Because the South lost that struggle, very few people know about the real Jefferson Davis, his wife, or about the story of Jim Limber. Jim was a black orphan, and Mrs Davis witnessed young Jim being beaten by his guardian. Mrs Davis rescued Jim, had the necessary papers filed making him free, and cared for him as her own child in the Confederate White House in Richmond. After the war, the Davises were captured, and Jim suffered along with his new parents at the hands of Yankee soldiers. He was forced to go to Washington with Capt Charles T Hudson, described by Mrs Davis as **an extremely rude and offensive man, certainly no military gentleman.** Jim didn't care for him either, but his screaming and begging made no difference. According to Northern newspapers, Jim was one of the Davis' slaves, and they had inflicted the beatings Jim had suffered. Mrs Davis attempted to set the record straight, but

We can only imagine
the horrors little Jim Limber
would have undoubtedly
been doomed to endure
had not those kind, compassionate,
morally superior, black-loving Yankees
not rescued him from
the evil slave-beating Davises.

Yankee newspapers were not interested in the truth. Other than those newspaper accounts, the Davises never found out what happened to Jim, nor has anyone else.

Robert E Lee (Confederate General):⁴

Gen Lee was widely considered (not just by Southerners) the greatest general of the war, and in fact, one of the greatest generals of all time. He was regarded by the North after the war, not as a failure or a traitor, but as a noble man, a hero. The *New York Herald* encouraged the Democrat party to nominate him as their presidential candidate to run against Grant in the 1868 election.

Lee freed his inherited slaves before the Emancipation Proclamation (EP). He argued during the war for abolition of slavery in the South, and he supported black enlistment in the Confederate army, both to support the South and to help prepare those slaves for freedom. Lee's views of slavery were much the same as Jefferson Davis'.

In this enlightened age, there are few I believe, but what will acknowledge, that slavery as an institution, is a moral and political evil in any Country. It is useless to expatiate on its disadvantages. The blacks are immeasurably better off here than in Africa, morally, socially and physically.

We see the course of the final abolition of human slavery is onward, and we must give it all the aid of our prayers and all justifiable means in our power.

Robert E Lee was the South's George Washington. How did he feel about secession?

I wish to live under no other government, and there is no sacrifice I am not ready to make for the preservation of the Union save that of honour. . . I wish for no other flag than the star-spangled banner . . . I still hope that the wisdom and patriotism of the nation will yet save it.

⁴ CWC, p95-112

He resisted secession until he felt there was no other choice. Like many other Southern generals, he could have become an officer for the North, but he was compelled as a matter of honor to support his native Virginia and his brothers in the South. He believed that debate, persuasion, and compromise were the appropriate approach to resolving American political disputes. War was not.

He was a Christian southern gentleman, self-disciplined, devoted to duty. He would go to great lengths to avoid conflict, but when unavoidable, he was ferocious and clever. In battle he was more concerned about others' suffering than his own. Toward the end of the war, one of his generals suggested the Confederates begin a guerilla war, but Lee explained patiently that that would be a very bad idea, concluding his remarks with:

As for myself, while you young men might afford to go to bushwhacking, the only proper and dignified course for me would be to surrender myself and take the consequences of my actions.

The young general didn't say another word about it, and he felt ashamed for even having brought it up. Lee recommended to Jefferson Davis that hostilities cease. He devoted the rest of his life to rebuilding the South.

George B McClellan (Union General):⁵

McClellan was arguably the Union's most colorful general. He was, in some ways, one of the Confederacy's best assets. He was easily the North's most likely to succeed, with all the credentials for military greatness. He was widely regarded as a young Napoleon, and by no one more so than himself. But on the battlefield he was a failure. He was one of the very best at organizing and training his men, and caring for them. No one was better at preparing for battle. Yet he consistently shied away from battle himself, and he proved to be a great disappointment to AL. (The feeling was mutual.)

He was a fascinating mix of kinships and contrasts. He preferred the company of Southern gentlemen to Yankees, and he shared their devotion to manners. But Southern manners derived from chivalry, charm, and aristocratic poise. McClellan's manners were more a manifestation of snobbery afforded the son of a Philadelphia doctor.

He had a slave of his own in Mexico. He agreed with the South that slavery was a Constitutional right, and it therefore deserved legal protection. He found the concept of racial equality obnoxious and ridiculous. **I confess to a prejudice in favor of my own race, and can't learn to like the odor of either billy goats or niggers.**

Had he been given the power, he would have found a way to end slavery in a way that protected and compensated slave owners and truly liberated slaves, providing them assistance during their transition to freedom. (Why didn't AL think of that?) McClellan also, unlike other Union generals and politicians, including AL, believed firmly in maintaining strict discipline in Union-occupied areas, and he was committed to strictly enforcing property and personal rights for all, including Confederate sympathizers.

⁵ CWC, p263-280

Unlike other Union leaders and Yankees in general, McClellan saw the Civil War as strictly a campaign to preserve the Union. It was not, to him, the crusade of a radical ideology. It was not a war to abolish slavery, because although it was a most unfortunate part of Southern life and culture, it was also the law of the land, made legal by COTUS, and affirmed by the Supreme Court (SCOTUS). He felt the war should be conducted consistent with Christian values. It should not be executed as a ruthless, savage campaign against Southern civilians. Those American civilians should be treated with respect, since the goal, after all, was always to preserve the sort of Union that Confederates would want to return to. (Why didn't AL think of that)?

Still, in spite of all the profound and fundamental differences, McClellan was devoted to the Union.

Like Stonewall Jackson, McClellan converted to Calvinism. But they took from it entirely different philosophies of battle. For Jackson, Calvinism's doctrine of predestination meant that he (and other like-minded soldiers) need not be concerned about death. He was fearless on the battlefield simply because God had already made arrangements for the exact time, place, and manner of his death, and therefore it was entirely out of his hands. There was no point fretting about the possibility of getting killed in action when he had absolutely no control over it.

McClellan's Calvinism, however, convinced him that God had chosen (predestined) him to be the military savior of the Union. That belief had profound implications for his philosophy of battle. For one thing, it necessarily meant that McClellan was always right. Always. How could he not be? With God as his Commander-in-Chief, instructing and guiding him, how could he possibly be wrong about anything? Throughout his military career (and probably his entire adult life), he was extremely skilled at blaming anyone and everyone else for any of his perceived (or even anticipated) failures.

His messiah complex placed him at odds with his own generals, his military superiors, with politicians, and with AL (many of whom had a messiah complex of their own). He frequently dissed AL, his cabinet members, and members of Congress, and he was much less than cordial with anyone who pressed him for details of his military plans. (One notable exception would be when he wanted to leak information to the *New York Herald*).

Although he was generally one of the best military administrators, there was one area that suffered greatly – gathering intelligence. Allan Pinkerton (who later became a famous detective) was placed in charge of finding out what the enemy was up to. His reports typically were based more on rumor and imagination than on facts. As a result, the perceived strength and number of enemy forces were often wildly inflated.

That, however, was just fine with McClellan. Because, the way he figured it, he was predestined to be the great military savior of the country. The only way that could happen is if he defeated a military force much larger and more powerful than his own, or at least was perceived to be by the public. **The enemy have from three to four times my force**, was his constant cry, and he soundly condemned both his commanding officer, Gen Winfield Scott, and AL for not recognizing **the true state of affairs**. McClellan called AL an **idiot** and the **Gorilla**. However, the true state of affairs was that McClellan's forces consistently outnumbered Confederate forces. Still, McClellan issued an ultimatum:

If he [Winfield Scott] cannot be taken out of my path, I will resign and let the administration take care of itself. . . . The people call upon me to save the country – I must save it and cannot respect anything that is in the way.

Gen Winfield Scott, a proven military hero, who had accurately assessed the strength of enemy forces, was retired. Gen George B McClellan was promoted to general in chief of the army, in addition to his current responsibilities as commander of the Army of the

Potomac. When AL asked him if he could handle both sets of duties at the same time, McClellan replied tersely, **I can do it all.**

McCLELLAN'S overriding concern with every battlefield decision was avoiding any military defeat that would embarrass the Union or, more importantly, himself. He considered himself the indispensable man. So, his army was much better at parading than at fighting. **I feel too that I must not unnecessarily risk my life – for the fate of my army depends upon me and they all know it.**

He repeatedly wildly overestimated the size of opposing forces, requested more troops than AL could possibly provide, and adopted unreasonably cautious tactics instead of vigorously pursuing Confederate forces. As a result, his fears became a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading to the very embarrassing defeats he so desperately tried to avoid. His only option, then, was to make sure someone else always got the blame. Nothing could ever possibly be his fault, because he was God's chosen One. Blaming McClellan would be like blaming God himself. **If it is so, the fault will not be mine** was McClellan's motto.

An interesting example is this story. When one of McClellan's own generals took a cautious approach, he was severely rebuked by his boss. Gen Thomas A Morris accurately reported during the Rich Mountains campaign that the enemy force he faced was larger than his own, stating: **I confess I feel apprehensive unless our force could equal theirs.** Morris had already proven himself to be a capable general, and his appeal was entirely consistent with McClellan's own philosophy and practice. Still, McClellan threatened to replace him, responding with this condescending animadversion:

I propose taking the really difficult and dangerous part of this work on my own hands. . . . [My troops will] decide the fate of the campaign. . . . I have spoken plainly – I speak officially – the crisis is a grave one, and I must have generals under me who are willing to risk as much as I am.

So, McClellan was adept at blaming others even before anything went wrong. His biographer, Stephen Sears, points out that McClellan's risk was only slight and greatly exaggerated. Had self-esteem, a sense of self-entitlement, and self confidence been effective battlefield resources, McClellan could easily have won the war single-handedly. But faced with the prospect of backing up his bravado and enormous ego, he was a flop. He skedaddled from Richmond, even though he had every advantage. His forces outnumbered Lee's by more than two to one, and he had already received Lee's battle plans. McClellan managed to rationalize even that humiliating, disgraceful performance with this gem of self-delusion:

I think I begin to see his [God's] wise purpose in this. . . . If I had succeeded in taking Richmond now the fanatics [abolitionists] of the North might have been too powerful and reunion impossible.

And there is this incredibly cowardly excuse for failing to pursue Lee's army:

At that moment – Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland invaded – the national cause could afford no risks of defeat.

And there is this incredibly arrogant assessment of his own performance:

God has in his mercy a second time made me the instrument of saving the nation.

It is extremely difficult to imagine how God would claim any credit for McClellan's performance. Unless, maybe, God was on the side of the South. After all, men like Stonewall Jackson had just as much faith as McClellan. It seems, however, that Jackson's faith was in God. McClellan's faith was in McClellan. Of course, that would lead to the obvious question of why, if God was on the side of the Confederate cause, the Union won the war. Does that prove that God was rooting for the North? It's

extremely difficult to imagine how God would claim credit for any of AL's actions, as well. AL was responsible for the deaths of 650,000 Americans, including thousands of innocent, defenseless women, children, and blacks – the very people AL would have us believe, in the end, he went to war for in the first place. AL also destroyed COTUS and our republican form of government. Does God claim credit for that? I don't think so. I give AL full credit for the Civil War, not God.

McClellan's battlefield philosophy also was diametrically opposed to that of Gen Grant. Grant's approach was to seek out the enemy, go straight at him, slug it out, never give up, and never stop until the job is finished, no matter what the cost. McClellan described his own philosophy this way:

There is only one safe rule in war, to decide what is the very worst thing that can happen to you, and prepare to meet it.

Grant succeeded. McClellan failed. Still, McClellan's words were in a sense prescient.

The would-be Union savior hated South Carolina and Massachusetts, both of which he considered full of extremists and troublemakers. He would have had no problem with them seceding. And he played a part in West Virginia seceding from Virginia. That secession was just hunky dory with McClellan, AL, and everyone in the North. But Southern secession – they most certainly couldn't go for that. That was different and totally unacceptable. Exactly why was it different and unacceptable? It had nothing to do with the law or COTUS or slavery. It was wrong simply because Yankees decided in their infinite wisdom that it was wrong, and they had the military means to prove their point. It seems that *messiah complex* problem was a Yankee epidemic.

When relieved of his command, McClellan and AL openly became political foes. McClellan's frustrations and strong political disagreements had to stay bottled up as long as he served under AL's command. But now he was free to say what he really

thought. And he did so. McClellan was the 1864 Democrat candidate for President. Much earlier, McClellan, although he had referred to AL as a **well-meaning baboon**, had also said that: **The President is perfectly honest and is really sound on the nigger question**. Of course, that had been before AL completely changed his position on slavery and issued EP, which was itself a violation of COTUS, according to McClellan. But there were much more compelling reasons for opposing AL in the 1864 election.

McClellan was appalled at the way the war had been conducted against Southern civilians. He believed that EP and suspension of habeas corpus together had made AL a despot. He believed that AL had overthrown COTUS, trampled on the rights it was designed to protect, and made a mockery of the Constitutional Union he had pretended to preserve. (Finally, there was someone in the North who understood that AL's conduct was unconstitutional and evil).

As it turned out, McClellan wasn't having much luck in politics, either, so he lived off his investments and moved to Europe until Grant became POTUS. McClellan later became Governor of New Jersey. There he finally found a job he was good at.

William Tecumseh Sherman (Union General):⁶

Gen Sherman took a utilitarian approach to the Civil War. He (like AL) didn't have much use for COTUS, because he had a better way. Do whatever is best for the greatest number of people (Yankees, that is), whatever it takes. According to the Constitution of Sherman, might makes right, survival of the fittest. Simple as that.

It's important to understand that he (again, like AL) did not believe secession was unconstitutional or illegal, it was just wrong because he believed it was wrong, and he had the army to back it up. No need to waste time with SCOTUS, because the fight belonged on the battlefield. It's also important to understand that this was the North's mindset.

Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, precious relics of former history, must not be construed too largely.⁷

Progressivism as such was not born until the time of Woodrow Wilson. But WW couldn't have said it better than this quote from Sherman. WW greatly admired AL, and he no doubt also admired Sherman, precisely because they had abandoned COTUS. The word *progressivism* wasn't defined until the time of WW, but AL and Sherman gave birth to the philosophy and put it into practice.

Sherman was not an abolitionist. In fact, he hated abolitionists, even though his brother was one. He also hated the politicians (even though his brother was one of those too) who led us into war. He at first had recommended just leaving the South alone, and eventually they would see the error of their ways, as the prosperous North left them in the economic dust. But, like the rest of the North, Sherman quickly realized that the

⁶ CWC, p133-154

⁷ SRK, p311

Union couldn't afford to just let the South go, because that would have wreaked havoc on Northern trade and tariffs. Again, it was not a legal or moral issue of slavery, or a Constitutional obligation to preserve the Union. It was simply a matter of money.

Economic reality required the North to act quickly. Philosophically, Sherman preferred to just leave the South alone, let them go their own way, make their own mistakes, and eventually come to their senses. But war was inevitable, from a Yankee perspective, because the Confederacy insisted on free trade. Money was far more important than philosophy, morals, principles, values, COTUS, or even human life itself. Sherman explains it for us:

Even if the Southern States be allowed to depart in peace, the first question will be revenue. Now if the South have free trade, how can you collect revenues in eastern cities. Freight from New Orleans to St Louis, Chicago, Louisville, Cincinnati, and even Pittsburgh, would be about the same as by rail from New York, and importers at New Orleans, having no duties to pay, would undersell the East if they had to pay duties. There, if the South make good their confederation and their plan, the Northern Confederacy must do likewise or blockade. Then comes the question of foreign nations. So, look on it in any view, I see no result but war and consequent change in the form of government.

Sherman said the war was not about **idle and nonsensical side issues of niggers, state rights, conciliation, outrages, cruelty, barbarity, bankruptcy, subjugations, etc.** It was a great crusade against **the ridiculous pretences of state government, liable to explode at the call of any mob.** As far as he was concerned, the states **represented the tendency to anarchy. . . . I have seen it all over America and our only hope is Uncle Sam.**

Whatever else one may think of Sherman, he was basically an honest man. He pretty much tells it like it is, with no regard for political correctness. It's too bad AL was not as candid and frank about his reasons for war. Sherman was also much more realistic in

his assessment of the cost of the war, predicting it would result in hundreds of thousands of casualties. But it was necessary, in spite of that. The South's democratic spirit, their determination to establish their own form of government, had to be crushed. He wrote to his brother:

A government resting on the caprice of the people is too unstable to last. . . . [All] must obey. Government, that is the executive, having no discretion but to execute the law must be to that extent despotic. . . . We have for years been drifting towards an unadulterated democracy or demagogism. Therefore our government should become a machine, self-regulating, independent of the man.

Alexander Hamilton would have been so proud. WW was in full agreement. Most of the Framers and Founders would have fought against such tyranny. In fact, they did so, in the Revolutionary War. But AL and Sherman were so much smarter than the Framers and Founders. They knew what was best for the country, even if the people themselves didn't understand it. Forget the Constitution. Uncle Sam didn't need all that any more, and in fact, it had to be destroyed, because it was getting in his way, and that was simply not acceptable. Democracy had to be destroyed as well. **Our adversaries have the weakness of slavery in their midst to offset our democracy.**

Given the general's utilitarian philosophy, it is no surprise that he so utterly destroyed the South. And given the persistent rumors of his questionable mental stability, it is maybe not too surprising that he suggested (and got approval for) a bizarre scheme of deporting Confederates. It didn't matter much where they went, although Madagascar and French Guiana were suggested. Just so they got out and made room for Yankees to move down and take over the South. Part of his plan was fulfilled by Reconstruction. But even during the war it was placed into action. Sherman evacuated Atlanta. Grant tried to drive Virginians out of the Shenandoah Valley. About 20,000 suspected Confederates were driven from their homes (which were burned) in Missouri.

After the war, Sherman controlled occupied Memphis. He realized that some of its citizens may have been Union sympathizers all along, but that mattered not. The city had been on the wrong side of the war, so they were all considered prisoners of war, and subject to the harsh conditions that came with it. For all his tough talk, however, he was less strict than its previous administration had been. When his brother John, elected to the US Senate, advocated harsh treatment of the South, Sherman disagreed. He returned to the idea that the South should just be left alone, not provoked or reconstructed, at least not by Radical Republicans. He opposed black suffrage and supported segregation.

Let the Lincoln Memorial serve as a reminder that in the Civil War America traded in her philosopher Founders like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson for psychopathic war criminals like Wm Tecumseh Sherman. Little wonder that progressives have led America to the brink of destruction. Yet we worship Abraham Lincoln as a great president and American leader. It's difficult to see how this country could be any more self-defeating and self-destructive.

He returned to St Louis and enjoyed an active social life which did not involve his wife. She, in his view, was useful only for raising his children and listening to his complaints.

Thomas Jonathan (Stonewall) Jackson (Confederate General):⁸

"Stonewall" Jackson, like virtually everyone else in the South, took slavery for granted. But he didn't think of slaves as property. He considered them friends, partly because some of his own relatives had been indentured servants. Although he wasn't an outstanding student himself (and was derisively called *Tom Fool* when he taught at the Virginia Military Institute), he established a Sunday School for slaves and taught them how to read (even though it wasn't exactly legal). Two of his Sunday School students asked Jackson to buy them, which he did. He acquired another slave and her two sons through marriage, and he took in an orphaned slave. Even in the heat of battle, Jackson found time to write a periodic check to support his Sunday School.

His attitude toward slaves came from his religious beliefs. According to his wife:

He would have preferred to see the negroes free, but he believed that the Bible taught that slavery was sanctioned by the Creator himself, who maketh men to differ, and instituted laws for the bond and the free. He therefore accepted slavery, as it existed in the Southern States not as a thing desirable in itself, but as allowed by Providence for ends it was not his business to determine.

Stonewall Jackson, like Robert E Lee and most other Confederate leaders, was a Unionist right up to the war. Even after AL's election Jackson said:

If the North denies Virginia the rights guaranteed to us by the Constitution of our country, if the North should endeavor to subjugate us, and thus excite our slaves to servile insurrection in which our families will be murdered without quarter or mercy, it becomes us to wage such a war as will bring hostilities to a speedy close. People who

⁸ CWC, p223-242

are anxious to bring on war don't know what they are bargaining for; they don't see all the horrors that must accompany such an event. For myself I have never yet been induced to believe that Virginia will even have to leave the Union.

Why, at that late date, did he hold out hope that war, and even secession, could be avoided? Because he thought that, once the North saw that the South wasn't bluffing, the North would come to its senses and call the whole thing off. And where in the world would he get a crazy idea like that? From COTUS. The COTUS that guaranteed each state the right to secede. The COTUS that protected States' Rights, and was designed to guard against just such action by the North. The COTUS that, with its checks and balances, its separation of powers, was designed to prevent just the kind of things that AL was doing. (The COTUS that AL and his generals ignored, and thus helped destroy).

Once the war started, Jackson advocated a very aggressive strategy. On that he and Gen Lee were generally on the same page. But Jackson was even more aggressive than Lee. Jackson proposed seizing Baltimore, bringing Maryland into the Southern alliance, chasing the Federals out of Washington, attacking McClellan's army, destroying as much as possible the North's industrial facilities and capability, disrupting their lines of commerce, closing their coal mines, taking control of Philadelphia and other large cities, and making unrelenting war on Northern homes, forcing Yankees to reconsider their commitment to the war.

In sharp contrast to Stonewall Jackson

and other Southern generals,

most Union leaders didn't seriously consider COTUS in their rationalization of their war of aggression.

To them, COTUS was not a factor at all.

What mattered to them was what they thought, what they wanted, and what they had the military means to force on the Confederacy.

That is the tragedy of the Civil War.

How far was he willing to take it? Was he suggesting killing civilians, as Sherman did in the South? It's not clear. Certainly Gen Lee was not willing to go that far. But, more importantly, Jefferson Davis was not willing to go even as far as Gen Lee would have liked. Davis considered protecting the Confederacy's borders the highest military priority. He also was determined to keep the South on the moral high ground. The North was clearly the aggressor in the Civil War, and he did not want to provide any confusion on that point.

Looking back, it is likely that Jackson was on the right track. The South would have been much better off following the Jackson approach to a certain extent. Not to the point of killing Northern civilians, but to the point of taking the war quickly into the North, and destroying their war capabilities as much as possible. But Davis was in charge, and he ordered a more defensive war strategy.

He received the nickname "Stonewall" in the battle of First Manassas, when he and his group of Virginia volunteers remained calm while others panicked. Gen Bernard Bee yelled frantically that the Federals were driving them back, to which Jackson replied, **Then sir, we will give them the bayonet.** Jackson remained cool and determined even when a bullet struck a finger on his left hand. Gen Bee was inspired by Jackson's composure, and he was able to rally his men by yelling, **Look, men, there stands Jackson like a stone wall! Rally 'round the Virginians.**

He later reinforced his reputation and stature in a series of battles in the Shenandoah Valley. Although they were relatively insignificant battles in themselves, Jackson managed to use his small force to torment much larger Union forces and keep them bottled up in the Valley, preventing them from joining other Union forces in an assault on Richmond.

After the battle of First Manassas, a captain asked Jackson how he managed to remain so unruffled. He answered:

Captain, my religious belief teaches me to feel as safe in battle as in bed. God fixed a time for my death. I do not concern myself about that, but to be always ready, no matter when it may overtake me. Captain, that is the way all men should live, and then all would be equally brave.

It's difficult to argue with that philosophy. But it is also difficult to miss its irony. Jackson masterminded and carried out the battle of Chancellorsville, arguably the most brilliant Confederate victory of the entire Civil War. After defying death so many times in so many battles, he was then killed by a bullet from a Confederate soldier who thought he was part of a Union patrol.

If that was part of a divine plan, it certainly is a bizarre example of God working in mysterious ways. Robert E Lee later remarked that if he had had Jackson at Gettysburg, the South could have won that battle, and probably the war. It appears, then, that the Confederacy may well have defeated itself in the Civil War more effectively than the Union did.

Or maybe it was simply God's will. But I doubt God is willing to take credit for destruction of the South, destruction of COTUS, and slaughter of 650,000 Americans, including thousands of innocent and defenseless Southern women and children. I give AL full credit for all that.

James Longstreet (Confederate General):⁹

Gen Longstreet had been friends with Gen Grant before the war, and they became friends again after the war, as well as political allies when Longstreet became a Republican politician during Reconstruction.

Longstreet had a reputation as being rather slow. His boss, Robert E Lee, may have understood that if he was slow it was because he was careful. But what Lee apparently did not understand is that sometimes Longstreet was slow because he didn't like Lee's orders. As an officer, of course, he had to follow orders. But he didn't necessarily have to be quick about it. Was it a matter of taking extra precautions in situations which Longstreet considered extremely risky, or did Longstreet drag his feet as a passive-aggressive response to what he considered ill-advised battle plans?

Hard to say, but it is widely believed that Longstreet lost the war for the South because of it. Had he carried out Lee's orders promptly at Gettysburg, it seems likely (to some, at least) that the South would have won that battle and therefore the war. Hundreds of thousands of lives could have been spared, and COTUS could have been preserved. Indeed, the most devastating aspect of the Civil War is that it was a long series of tragic, deadly, missed opportunities. On both sides. Throughout the battles, and even through Reconstruction. AL fired general after general before finally coming to Grant. Lee, on the other hand, was there from the beginning, and he was by far the best Southern general, but those under him blew it time after time.

Some think Lee himself blew it at Gettysburg. Many believe Longstreet's resistance to Lee's plan was absolutely justified, because Lee's plan had no chance of success and Longstreet knew it. He said, just before Pickett's Charge:

⁹ CWC, p155-172

General Lee, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know as well as anyone what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arrayed for battle can take that position.

That may have been true. It will be debated forever. What seems undeniable, however, is that if Longstreet could not convince Lee of that, he was obligated to either carry out Lee's orders promptly to the best of his ability, or refuse to do so, and let Lee either reconsider or find someone who would do what Longstreet refused to do. Gen A P Hill had asked for the assignment, and he would have been better suited for it, while Longstreet would have been better suited for a support role in that battle. Why didn't Longstreet just ask Lee to give Hill the job?

If Longstreet felt that strongly about it, why did he finally carry out the orders at all? Delaying was the worst possible decision he could have made, and the most irresponsible and cowardly, in my book. Longstreet, therefore, bears the brunt of responsibility for the Confederate loss at Gettysburg, and possibly the entire war. If he had done his job, one way or the other, Lee would have deserved full responsibility for the loss. Or, credit for the victory.

Longstreet's conduct at Gettysburg had its roots in a fundamental difference in approaches to fighting the Civil War. And perhaps those fundamentally different approaches to the war had roots in the fact that Longstreet was a Dutchman. The rest of Lee's top generals were all fellow Virginians. One Longstreet biographer said:

There was something curiously unSouthern about him. He was serious and stolid, not romantic as proper Southerners of that age were, more materialistic than idealistic.

While the cavalier Virginians believed in an offensive war against the Union, Longstreet preferred a defensive strategy, more in tune with Jefferson Davis' thinking. Lee's thinking (along with Stonewall Jackson) was that the best approach was to strike suddenly, strike hard, surprise the Yankees, and throw the Union off guard. Seeing heavier than expected early casualties, the Union troops would therefore be forced to reconsider whether the war was worth the cost. And the North in general would be faced with the same question.

Longstreet, however, was convinced that the only way to win the war was to make the Yankees attack them. He didn't object to an offensive campaign in Pennsylvania, as long as they reverted to strong defensive positions once they had arrived at a strategic location suitable for battle. Basically, that meant placing Confederate forces between Grant and Washington DC. Confederate forces, dug in and well prepared for a defensive battle, would therefore minimize their own casualties. He knew that was the only way to offset the huge Union advantage in manpower. It was basically the same strategy Washington had used successfully in the Revolutionary War. Winning would result simply by not losing.

Lee rejected that strategy, because, although Longstreet had a good point, Lee reasoned that the result of Longstreet's approach would necessarily be a long, protracted war. True, the South didn't have the Union's manpower, but they also didn't have the other resources necessary to carry on a long war.

Who was right at Gettysburg? I don't know. Why didn't Lee hand the assignment to Hill, with Longstreet in support, making both of his generals happy (or at least less unhappy)? Hill was certainly capable enough, and eager. I don't know. What I do know is that Lee was in charge. Longstreet and Hill were not. That was a source of great annoyance to Longstreet, who believed he should be in charge, and that he could do a better job. What I also know is that, under Lee's command, Longstreet usually did a superb job as a corps commander. Later, when he had an opportunity to exercise more

autonomy away from Lee, Longstreet flopped. Lee needed Longstreet, and he relied heavily on him. But, although Longstreet didn't realize it, he also needed Lee.

Lee never needed Longstreet more than he did at Gettysburg. And Longstreet had never let Lee down like he did there. Lee understood the need to attack the Federals, to deliver a quick, crushing defeat. Lee was outnumbered, and the odds were long, but he had faced those conditions before, and he usually rode away with the victory. Whatever merit Longstreet's defensive strategy may have had, his defensive model was not viable at Gettysburg, and Lee knew it.

Striking the center of the Union line on the third day at Gettysburg was certainly more practical and feasible than Longstreet's plan. His idea involved retreating from a battle already started, maneuvering in hostile territory, and risking defeat of the entire Confederate army. Overall, however, Longstreet was Lee's second most dependable general, surpassed only by Stonewall Jackson.

Longstreet was born in South Carolina, grew up in Georgia, and was sent to West Point by Alabama. When he joined the Confederate army, he chose to represent the state of Alabama. Why? He was the senior Alabama graduate of West Point. As such, he stood to be promoted faster.

In one book, Longstreet was described this way:

Six feet tall, broad as a door, hairy as a goat, there was something about Longstreet that would have inspired confidence even if his dogmatic utterances on all subjects had not done so. . . . It was hard to resist that Viking, with his immense Lombard beard, his rugged power, and his invincible certainty.

A member of Longstreet's staff described him this way:

A most striking figure, about forty years of age, a soldier every inch, and very handsome, tall and well proportioned, strong and active, a superb horseman and with an unsurpassed soldierly bearing, his features and expression fairly matched; a full brown beard, head well shaped and poised.

Like all successful generals, he did not doubt his own ability. When asked by a young officer how long he thought the war would last, he replied: **At least three years, and if it holds for five you may begin to look for a dictator.** The young officer replied: **If we are to have a dictator, I hope that you may be that man.** Longstreet did not disagree. That was not his immediate goal, however. Nor did he want to be a line officer. He preferred the job of Confederate army paymaster, because the pay was better. But West Point graduates were much too valuable for that.

Instead, he was quickly promoted from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general, and he became Lee's most senior corps commander. Lee considered him the best administrator among his top generals. Longstreet heartily agreed with that assessment, and he furthermore considered himself one of the army's best strategists and tacticians. His duty, as he saw it, was to bring his men to the right place at the right time. If he disagreed with his commanding officer about the best way to achieve that goal, and he frequently did, he also considered it his duty to try to impose his will. He was often successful. Perhaps that's why he was so stubborn at Gettysburg – he was used to getting his way, and he did not take it well when overruled.

The battle of Second Manassas also, I think, helps us understand Longstreet's behavior at Gettysburg. Stonewall Jackson's men were holding the Union line in a desperate battle. Despite the tremendous pressure on Jackson, and despite three direct orders from Lee to relieve Jackson immediately, Longstreet thoroughly surveyed the grounds, methodically arranged his troops, and finally went to Jackson's aid, delivering a last-minute crushing blow to the Union forces and bringing a stunning Confederate victory. Perhaps he expected Gettysburg to work out much the same way. He would follow

orders, but he would do it in his own way and in his own time, thus pulling out a miraculous victory as only he could do it, and in a way that proved to Lee that Longstreet had been right all along.

Longstreet did not achieve effective command presence by lofty speeches. He was, in fact, a taciturn man. He was effective because he was able to convince his men that a battle was no more dangerous for a brave man than drinking iced tea on the porch. Longstreet's characteristic stubbornness spread to his men. It gave them a tremendous determination to stand their ground, no matter what. They accepted Longstreet's philosophy that in any battle, one side is going to run first. All that was necessary for victory was to refuse to be the first men to run. Of course, many Civil War battles demonstrated that it doesn't always work that way. Sometimes neither side runs; one side simply gets slaughtered. But Longstreet didn't acknowledge that possibility, for good reason.

During the war, not even Gettysburg permanently damaged his reputation as one of the South's most capable corps commanders. After the death of Stonewall Jackson, Lee relied on Longstreet more than ever. In the battle of Sharpsburg he wore his house slippers to relieve the pain of a blister on his foot. The comical sight of a general waging battle in his house slippers would probably have resulted in most generals getting laughed out of command. Not Longstreet.

But after the war, his reputation quickly plummeted in the South. He accepted Reconstruction, encouraged cooperation with it, and discouraged any resistance to federal authority and control. That, however, is not what cemented his reputation as a scalawag, because lots of leading Confederates did all that. The South came to despise Longstreet because he joined forces with the Republican Party and was placed in charge of Reconstruction. To Longstreet it was simply the practical choice. To the South it was betrayal. And the ultimate betrayal came when Longstreet endorsed his buddy

Grant for president. He was rewarded with jobs from every Republican administration until his death at age 82.

There was something curiously unSouthern about him. The curiosity was gone.

Nathan Bedford Forrest (Confederate General):¹⁰

By the time AL was elected in 1860, Forrest was a millionaire. He had made his fortune largely in the slave trade. He became one of the Middle South's leading slave dealers, based on his reputation as an honest and fair trader – fair to both buyers and slaves.

As foreign and foul as it seems to us today, in the Old South slavery and the slave trade were accepted, without question. Importing and exporting slaves at American ports had been illegal for a long time, and the South not only accepted that, it supported the prohibition and encouraged enforcement of it. But buying and selling the slaves already here -- that was the law of the land and part of the South's way of life. Men like Forrest knew it was an ugly part of Southern life, but there was really nothing he could do about it except be as fair and kind a slave trader as he knew how to be.

A typical slave trader's ad might read something like this:

We have constantly at hand the best selected assortment of Field Hands, House Servants and Mechanics at our Negro Mart. Customers are encouraged to examine our stock before buying elsewhere.

Sounds similar to a modern ad for used-cars. Slave traders had the same social status as modern used-car salesmen.

Unlike most traders, Forrest never separated slave families, and whenever necessary, he would do his best to find a missing husband or wife, unite them, and keep them together. He earned a reputation for treating his slaves well, and that led to one of his biggest business problems – he couldn't keep up with appeals from slaves to be bought by him. He took a paternalistic approach to his slaves, insisting on high standards of

¹⁰ CWC, p173-197

cleanliness, neatness, and comfort at his slave mart. He also promised sellers a good home for their slaves.

Although Forrest went above and beyond what most slave traders were willing to do, his paternalistic approach to slavery was hardly unique. Most Southern slave owners had a paternalistic attitude toward their slaves. They were considered property, but they were valuable property, to be well cared for. It just made good sense from a business point of view. Unfortunately, Southern slave owners also used their superior treatment of slaves (compared to how blacks were treated by Yankees) as a rationalization for slavery. Reminding themselves of their compassionate treatment of slaves helped relieve the guilt of engaging in an activity they knew was morally wrong and evil.

As a wealthy man, Forrest had a great deal to lose in the war (and he did lose it). By 1861 he had moved past his slave-trader image and become a well-respected planter. He had held positions of authority, including a constable in Hernando, MS, and he had become known as an honest man, willing and able to fight against corruption and cowardice. Secession was not in his personal best interest, and he resisted it as long as possible. But when decision time arrived, he, like most Southern gentlemen, would not, could not, abandon his beloved home state (Tennessee).

In the war Gen Forrest killed thirty men in hand-to-hand combat, and he had 29 horses shot out from under him. By the end of the war he still had several bullets in his body that he had accumulated during battle. There was no better horseman anywhere (those 29 horses notwithstanding). He was feared and hated by Yankees, and for the same reasons he was considered a hero by the South. Union Gen Sherman said:

Forrest is the devil. . . . I will order them [two of Sherman's officers] to make up a force and go out to follow Forrest to the death, if it costs ten thousand lives and breaks the Treasury. There will never be peace in Tennessee until Forrest is dead.

It wasn't just his courage and determination in battle that brought Forrest success. He lacked a formal education, but he was literate and cunning. After chasing Federals across northern Alabama, their commander, Col Abel B Streight, was cordially invited by Forrest to surrender. While the two leaders were discussing and pondering their options, Forrest's men were making a point of bringing their artillery pieces into view. The same artillery was brought into view several times, giving the appearance that there were far more pieces than there actually were. Forrest, meanwhile, casually explained to the Union leader that if he chose not to surrender right away, Forrest could not be responsible for his men's actions, because they were pretty riled up to have a go at the Yankees. Streight surrendered his 1466 men. When he realized Forrest had less than 600 men, he was not a happy Yankee, which made Forrest laugh all the harder. He used that bluff over and over, with tremendous success.

But, to the extent that Forrest is known at all, what he is probably most often associated with is the Ku Klux Klan. It's hard to determine the truth of the matter. Forrest denied ever having been a member or having anything to do with it. He did have a general knowledge of it, and generally sympathized with it, but that's as far as it went, he claimed. However, he was widely believed to have been elected its first Grand Wizard.

Why would Forrest even sympathize with the Klan? Because he considered it a defender of Southern rights. He believed it was led by honorable and disciplined former Confederate officers whose purpose was to help preserve order and peace, a force against Radical Republicans. The KKK goal, he claimed, was not anarchy or insurgency, and he denied most reports of KKK violence and crimes.

Former Confederates overwhelmingly believed that Radical Republicans did not have the best interests of the South at heart. Forrest called for peace and obedience, but he liked knowing the KKK was there just in case the Radical Republicans got carried away, which was widely believed to be a very real possibility. His beef was with those Radical

Republicans, not with blacks. He hired newly freed blacks at higher than standard wages, and he formed partnerships with several Union officers. He said:

I am not an enemy of the negro. . . . We want him here among us; he is the only laboring class we have, and more than that, I would sooner trust him than the white scalawag or carpetbagger.

The only sense in which, Forrest claimed, the KKK was an anti-black organization is that in its origins it was designed to, among other things, defend white women and children from armed, hungry newly freed blacks foraging for food on Southern farms. That led to a few cases involving intimidation of blacks, threats against them, and even whippings and lynchings. While those exceptions got all the attention, that was not the intent or purpose of the Klan. According to Forrest, orders were issued to stop such behavior, and it had ended.

The KKK's Jul 17, 1867 General Order said:

We are not the enemy of the blacks, as long as they behave themselves, make no threats upon us, and do not attack or interfere with us.

KKK leaders denied having authorized any acts of unprovoked violence; they expressly claimed that such acts were emphatically wrong and were prohibited by the Klan; and they encouraged everyone to help protect all good, peaceful, law-aiding people – black and white alike.

In spite of that, cooler heads lost control of the organization. When it was no longer effective as a force for preserving peace and order, it was dissolved in 1869. Forrest testified that he had helped dismantle it as a unified organization. He publicly opposed white vigilantism and supported racial harmony. He also supported the idea of bringing more blacks (and Chinese) to the South.

Gen Forrest serves as a prime example of the propaganda that is CivilGate. The propagandists are eager to point out that Forrest was a member of the KKK. What you will never hear from them is that, even if that were true, it was certainly nothing for him to be ashamed of, given all the facts. CivilGate propagandists are perfectly happy to let you jump to your own grossly inaccurate conclusions about Gen Forrest. The truth is the opposite of what they are all too eager to have you believe.

There's a world of difference
between truth and facts.

Facts can obscure the truth.

-- Maya Angelou

A P Hill (Confederate General):¹¹

Ambrose Powell Hill didn't own slaves, he opposed slavery, and he condemned lynching. It was a crime, and it didn't happen much prior to the war, but in his home state a black man accused of killing a white man was hanged without a trial. It prompted this response from Hill in 1850:

Shame, shame upon you all, good citizens. Virginia must crawl unless you vindicate good order or discipline and hang every son of a bitch connected with this outrage.

Although he didn't relish the prospect of war any more than Stonewall Jackson or Robert E Lee did, he resigned his Union commission two weeks before Virginia seceded. He knew it was inevitable that his state would do so, and his ultimate loyalty was to his family and state.

Hill was perhaps the poster-general for Southern chivalry. After Hill's Light Brigade held back the Union army at Fredericksburg, his troops gave \$10,000 to the poor people of the city. And when a Union general surrendered to him on the battlefield, the following exchange took place:

Union Gen Prince: General, the fortunes of war have thrown me into your hands.

Gen Hill: Damn the fortunes of war, General! Get to the rear! You are in danger here!

He didn't always get along so well with his fellow Confederate generals, though. Gen Longstreet and Gen Jackson each had Gen Hill arrested. Hill challenged Longstreet to a duel. They frequently barely tolerated each other, and then only after the intervention of

¹¹ CWC, p243-261

Gen Lee. As a result, communication sometimes suffered, and so did Hill's men, who were badly managed when the generals could not agree on who was in charge.

Still, as Stonewall Jackson was dying he called out for his buddy "Little Powell" (Hill). And when Hill took a .58 caliber bullet in the heart, it broke Robert E Lee's heart. Lee later called out on his deathbed for "Little Powell", just as Jackson had done.

Hill was one of the best and least recognized Confederate generals. He was there for the South virtually throughout the war. He distinguished himself more for his battlefield enthusiasm than for his tactical genius. At times that was exactly what Gen Lee needed, but at other times Hill's impetuosity got a lot of his men killed. One of those times when Lee could have and should have put Hill's fighting spirit to good use was at Gettysburg. Hill wanted to lead the charge on the third day of that fateful battle, but Lee gave the assignment instead to the extremely reluctant Longstreet. Hill was much better at leading such a charge, and Longstreet was much better at playing a support role. To that extent, Robert E Lee bears full responsibility for the defeat at Gettysburg, although that doesn't get Longstreet off the hook.

For those who delight in reading the details of Civil War battles, their commanders, their strategies, their tactical maneuvers, their weapons, their leadership, etc, you will find plenty to enjoy in reading about Gen A P Hill. But here is my favorite story. Gen Robert E Lee and Confederate President Jefferson Davis were surveying a battlefield. Seeing that they were under enemy fire, Gen Hill rode up and said:

This is no place for either of you, and as commander of this part of the field I order you both to the rear!

Jefferson Davis was visibly annoyed, but he couldn't very well argue with Hill's logic or his motives, so he replied tersely: **We will obey your orders.**

When Hill noticed them a little later, departing at a slow trot, Hill once again took charge of the South's two headest honchos.

Did I not tell you to go away from here, and did you not promise to obey my orders?
Why, one shot from that battery over yonder may presently deprive the Confederacy of its President and the Army of Northern Virginia of its commander!

"Little Powell" may have been small in stature, but he certainly did not lack in spunk. A Confederate soldier described Hill this way:

General Hill was firm without austerity, genial without familiarity, and brave without ostentation. The gentleman and the soldier were so completely blended in him that he never had to deviate from one to the other. He was both all the time.

Well, not quite all the time, apparently. While a student at West Point, he got a little carried away on leave in New York, and he managed to contract a social disease. It cost him his girlfriend, set him back a year at West Point, caused him to miss the action in Mexico, and negatively impacted his health for the rest of his life.

George H Thomas (Union General):¹²

Not well known, but one of the North's best generals. Like Robert E Lee, Thomas was an officer in the US Army. Like Lee, he had to make a choice between the Union and his native state of Virginia. Unlike Lee, he did not conclude that the prospect of waging war against the South was so "repulsive to honor and humanity" that it compelled him to resign from the Union and support the South.

He was against slavery, but that didn't stop him from having a couple slaves of his own. He supported the idea of blacks joining the Union army.

In the sudden transition from slavery to freedom it is perhaps better for the negro to become a soldier, and be gradually taught to depend on himself for support, than to be thrown upon the cold charities of the world without sympathy or assistance.

His dislike for slavery also didn't stop him from adopting the Confederate practice of treating slaves as property. He may have railed against that idea, but when he found it convenient to do so, he made full use of it. He justified forced service by slaves in the Union army on the grounds that, since slaves were considered property by the South, they should be treated as property by the Union Army as well. (Hardly consistent with the CivilGate myth of Yankees as compassionate slave liberators, is it?)

Thomas had absolutely no regard for States' Rights. When a chaplain asked Thomas if dead soldiers should be buried in groups by state, he replied: **No, no, no. Mix them up. Mix them up. I'm tired of states' rights.**

¹² CWC, p113-132

He celebrated on April 3, 1865 when Richmond, the capital of his home state, was captured. And he had no sympathy for his fellow Southerners, especially the women. He treated Confederates harshly, during and after the war, and he said this to a Confederate guerilla commander: *I will so despoil Georgia that it will be a wilderness fifty years hence.*

During Reconstruction an Episcopal bishop of Alabama instructed his priests not to pray for Reconstruction authorities, including Thomas, who responded by closing all Episcopal churches in the state.

And when the mayor of Rome, Georgia, used Confederate flags in celebrating Georgia's secession day, Thomas responded with this letter to the mayor:

The sole cause of this and similar offenses lies in the fact that certain citizens of Rome, and a portion of the people of the States lately in rebellion, do not and have not accepted the situation, and that is, that the late civil war was a rebellion and history will so record it. Those engaged in it are and will be pronounced rebels; rebellion implies treason; and treason is a crime, and a heinous one too, and deserving of punishment; and that traitors have not been punished is owing to the magnanimity of the conquerors. With too many of the people of the South, the late civil war is called a revolution, rebels are called "Confederates," loyalists to the whole country are called d--d Yankees and traitors, and over the whole great crime with its accursed record of slaughtered heroes, patriots murdered because of their true-hearted love of country, widowed wives and orphaned children, and prisoners of war slain amid such horrors as find no parallel in the history of the world, they are trying to throw a gloss of respectability, and are thrusting with contumely and derision from their society the men and women who would not join hands with them in the work of ruining their country. Everywhere in the States lately in rebellion, treason is respectable and loyalty odious. This, the people of the United States, who ended the Rebellion and saved the country will not permit.

That seems to be an accurate reflection of the Northern position. It's important to remember that treason is the act of giving aid or comfort to America's enemies, which the South did not do. So, perhaps the lack of punishment was not attributable so much to the *magnanimity of the conquerors* as to the innocence of the accused.

But more significant and striking is that Thomas (and the North) ignores the 500-pound gorilla in the room. One cannot possibly avoid the glaring parallel between the South's fight for their freedom in the Civil War, and the Revolutionary War against England. One cannot read this letter without seeing a great deal of George III in George Thomas. One cannot help wondering why that struggle was righteous, but this one was not. The South's fight for freedom was even more justified, because they at least had the precedent of the Revolutionary War on their side.

Notice also Thomas' use of the word *conquerors*. How appropriate. That's precisely what the North accomplished in the Civil War. They conquered a sovereign nation, the Confederate States of America. They did not *liberate*, they conquered. They did not *preserve* the Union, they destroyed it through illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, unnecessary, imperial aggression. Conquest. According to AL, the South had not and could not secede, and the Confederates, therefore, had simply started a rebellion. So, how could the Union *conquer* states that were already part of the Union? Since Yankees had military might on their side, they didn't have to be logical, reasonable, legal, or moral.

Thomas is probably best known for one brief comment he made after a disastrous day of battle, faced with the prospect of another to follow. Gen Rosecrans asked for his assessment of what appeared to be a hopeless situation. He replied, **Gentlemen, I know of no better place to die than right here.** However admirable that resolve may have been, it was tragic that AL and his Union officers were so willing to kill 650,000 others in their bloody *conquest* of the Confederacy.

[Wade Hampton \(Confederate General\)](#)¹³

Wade Hampton III was born into a family of wealth, rich as well in distinguished military service. He would continue that tradition, but it would cost him everything he had. And he had a lot before the war. He was one of the South's largest landowners, with several thousand slaves, and he was a respected politician, serving in the state assembly and senate.

He was a moderate voice in South Carolina politics, arguing against secession, like many Southern political and military leaders. What changed his mind? What made him decide to risk his considerable wealth in secession and war? Was it slavery? Contrary to CivilGate myth, no. He wasn't afraid AL was going to take his slaves away. The legality of slavery had been affirmed by SCOTUS's *Dred Scott* ruling. AL told the nation in his First Inaugural Address that he did not intend to interfere with slavery in the South, and he had no authority to do so. Except for a small minority of abolitionists, which were mostly despised in both the North and the South, Yankees were very content to let the South keep their slaves, just so they kept them out of the territories and Northern states. That was because Yankees did not want to have to compete with black laborers for jobs and good wages. Yankees considered everyplace but the South white man's territory, and blacks, free or not, were most certainly not welcome by Yankees in their white-man's world. They had the state laws to back that up.

So, what was it that Hampton was willing to lose his considerable wealth and even his life for? He gives us part of the answer in these words spoken on the floor of the South Carolina Senate:

¹³ CWC, p283-296

I have not, sir, heretofore apprehended a dissolution of the Union – I have always desired its preservation. . . . But – I say this with deep conviction of its truth, though with profound regret – unless an entire revolution of public sentiment takes place at the North – unless that spirit of hostility towards us, that seems to have spread like some dread pestilence through-out their land, is rebuked, and speedily and effectually by the good and true men of the North . . . unless that religion which preaches rapine and murder is superseded . . . I do not see how the Union can be or should be preserved.

What was he talking about? The John Brown incident at Harpers Ferry. It wasn't the incident itself that had Hampton so upset, but the Northern abolitionists that treated Brown as a hero and a martyr. He was probably also referring to the abolitionist sentiment that had been stirred up by *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, the fictional portrayal of Southern slavery that Yankees ignorantly accepted as fact.

Hampton was also motivated by his deep, intense loyalty to his state, just as every other Confederate leader was. That's something the North could not comprehend or appreciate in any way. The South referred to it as *States' Rights*, which included not only Constitutional and legal rights, but also deep roots in Southern culture, traditions, values, beliefs, and lifestyles. Part of that was slavery. But it was only a part of the *States' Rights* concept, and it was not the reason for secession. It wasn't the reason the North was eager to go to war, either.

How did Hampton feel about slavery? The same way most other Confederate leaders felt about it, whether they owned slaves or not. He wasn't crazy about the idea of slavery, but he thought it was a necessary evil, which placed on slave owners the Christian obligation to treat their slaves well, as he did his several thousand slaves. That included treating them when they were sick (using his family doctors), keeping families together, letting them know he appreciated their work, and treating them with respect. The kind of respect that was seen throughout the antebellum South, but rarely in the North. Once a Philadelphia train ticket master told Hampton that his two slaves traveling

with him would have to go to a different car, and Hampton politely responded that the Yankee would have to go to hell.

How did Hampton feel about abolitionists? He despised them, much the same way most other people did, in both the North and the South. He considered abolitionists ignorant, and therefore, dangerous. They were radicals who knew nothing about slavery in the South. They appealed to a higher law which had no valid basis in either the Bible or COTUS, and their agitation threatened to split the Union. That threat was not an idle one in the John Brown incident.

With extensive properties in South Carolina and Mississippi, Hampton understood that it was his duty to form a regiment, train and supply them, and offer them to the governor. The governor was kind enough to share expenses in Hampton's case. He was commissioned a Colonel, and he led his legion of 1000 men to war, leaving his estate behind.

Author John Esten Cooke said this of Hampton:

It was plain that he thought nothing of personal decorations or military show, and never dreamed of producing an impression upon any one. . . . After being in his presence for ten minutes, you saw that he was a man for hard work, and not for display.

Unlike most Confederate generals, Hampton was not a West Point graduate, he was not a career military man, and in fact he had no military experience prior to the Civil War. He was there to do a job that had to be done, because he accepted that it was his responsibility to make a contribution, just as it was expected of all such prominent Southern landowners. He didn't care about military glory. He cared about the South, his home state of South Carolina, and of course his own estate. He was a cautious, conservative, middle-aged man in a position of responsibility and high regard. He was high-minded, committed to temperance, prudence, and duty. On the battlefield he was

unflappable and courageous, a model of composure and leadership, paternalistic with his men.

He rose quickly in rank and responsibility. He distinguished himself in battle time after time as a cavalry commander. Three times he had his head split open by a Yankee saber, but that didn't stop him. He held the head of one of his sons as he died on the battlefield, while another son was wounded, but not mortally. That didn't stop him. That just made him more determined than ever. He had a horse shot out from under him, and his hip was smashed by shrapnel. That didn't stop him.

After the war he returned to the scorched earth Sherman had left him. Gone were all the buildings, gone were his slaves, except a few who chose to stay and work for him, and gone was all his money. That didn't stop him, either. He built a house, planted crops for food, and sold just enough land to pay creditors.

One thing he had not lost was his respect as a South Carolina politician. But he was barred from holding public office, as were all Confederate officers. Later, after sanctions against former Confederate officers had been lifted, he became the Governor of South Carolina, and he was elected for a second term. He didn't serve that one, though, because he was elected to the US Senate, where he served two terms. He later served as railroad commissioner under Grover Cleveland.

When he retired to South Carolina, his house and all his possessions had been lost in a fire. He had little land left after selling most of it to pay creditors. How did he feel about the war at that point?

If we were wrong in our contest, then the Declaration of Independence was a grave mistake, and the Revolution to which it led was a crime . . . If Washington was a patriot, Lee cannot have been a rebel; if the enunciation of the grand truths in the Declaration of

Independence made Jefferson immortal, the observance of them could not have made Davis a traitor.

He also commented:

I am willing to send negroes to Congress. They will be better than anyone who can take the oath and I should rather trust them than renegades or Yankees.

Philip Sheridan (Union General)¹⁴

AL described Phil Sheridan as:

A brown, chunky little chap, with a long body, short legs, not enough neck to hang him, and such long arms that if his ankles itch he can scratch them without stooping.

Whatever Sheridan may have lacked in appearance, he more than made up for in enthusiasm for the Union war philosophy of annihilating the South. Yankee rationalization was that it was the best way to bring the war to an end quickly. But even when he got news of Lee's surrender, Sheridan was disappointed, because he was enjoying the war and he wasn't ready to stop killing and starving Southerners. **Damn them, I wish they had held out an hour longer and I would have whipped hell out of them.**

As a consolation prize, he helped other Yankee officers help themselves to the belongings of Wilmer McLean. He's the guy who offered the use of his home to Grant and Lee for the surrender. Not that Sheridan couldn't be chivalrous at times. In addition to the souvenirs he stole, he bought the surrender table, then gave it to Gen Custer's wife as a present.

Sheridan was on the same page when Grant said he wanted the Shenandoah Valley to become a desert, with all its livestock, crops, and food supplies either confiscated for Yankee use or destroyed. He didn't want even enough food left for the crows flying over the area. He wanted all the civilians in the area gone, too. That part was easy, once their homeland had been turned into a desert.

¹⁴ CWC, p297-308

Sheridan said: **This country is too great and good to be destroyed.** So, it just made good Yankee sense, therefore, to destroy the country. He had the pleasure of helping rip up railroad ties in Mississippi and bending them into a bowtie shape so they could not be salvaged. (That shape is an appropriate symbol for Yankee logic). Like virtually every other prominent Yankee, Sheridan had absolutely no interest in things like the law, COTUS, or internationally recognized standards of acceptable war practices. No, all that mattered was what he thought, what he felt was right, and what he wanted. He knew it was wrong for the South to secede, and those Rebels and their supporters (or potential supporters) in the South must be punished, taught a lesson, and taught some proper (Yankee) manners. It's difficult to understand why Confederates might have resisted such reasoning, isn't it?

According to this twisted logic, not only must the South be stopped from seceding, but Southern civilians must also be punished severely for their outrageous crime of desiring an independent country of their own, exercising their Constitutional right to secure it, and defending their homes against Yankee aggression. So Sheridan became an enthusiastic supporter of rapine and destruction in the Shenandoah Valley (known as "the burning"), and of martial law during Reconstruction.

Death is popularly considered to be the maximum of punishment in war, but it is not; reduction to poverty brings prayers for peace more surely and more quickly than does the destruction of human life.

I do not believe war to be simply that lines should engage each other in battle, and therefore do not regret the system of living on the enemy's country. These men or women [or children] did not care how many were killed, or maimed, so long as war did not come to their doors, but as soon as it did come in the shape of loss of property, they earnestly prayed for its termination. As war is a punishment, if we can, by reducing it [sic] advocates, to poverty, end it quicker, we are on the side of humanity.

Sheridan, in addition to being an expert at slaughtering and starving women and children, also had excellent skills as a bean-counter. One of his early assignments was chief quartermaster for the Army of Southwest Missouri. In that role he noticed that many Union soldiers were stealing horses from Southern farmers, then selling them to the Union Army. One of Sheridan's superior officers had no problem with that and encouraged the quartermaster to take the same approach. Sheridan, however, condemned such soldiers as common thieves, and declared that such activities would not be tolerated. His concern was not for the farmers, though. He was outraged simply because it was costing the Union Army money, and he was adamantly opposed to paying for the stolen horses.

Yes, Sheridan, Sherman, Grant, and Lincoln were quite the humanitarians, weren't they? Who could deny that innocent defenseless women, children, old men, and blacks are fair game in war? Thousands of them were killed by those compassionate Yankee humanitarians, and who among us today does not owe those Yankee generals our undying gratitude for gallantly defeating those evil unarmed Southern civilians. Especially the children. If those brave Yankees didn't slaughter them when they were extremely young, they would be just that much harder to kill later.

Yankee civilians must have been so proud of their brave military heroes, standing up to those Southern women and children so valiantly! Doesn't it just bring tears to your eyes?

After the war, Sheridan embraced the role of dictator in his control of Texas and Louisiana. He was free to depose governors, mayors, and any other despised Southerners as he pleased. He especially hated Texans. **If I owned hell and Texas, I would rent out Texas and live in hell.** (Texans, no doubt, consider that Sheridan's only shred of compassion).

Later, he applied his brutal war philosophy to Indians. In their case, the tactical battle plan was to destroy all buffalo in the area. He didn't have anything against buffalo, or any other animal except Southerners. He just wanted to starve the Indians.

Those men [buffalo hunters] have done more in the last two years and will do more in the next year to settle the Indian question than the entire regular army has done in the last thirty years. They are destroying the Indians' commissary; and it is a well known fact that an army losing its base of supplies is placed at a great disadvantage. Send them powder and lead if you will, and for the sake of peace let them kill, skin, and sell until they have exterminated the buffalo. Then your prairies will be covered with speckled cattle and the festive cowboy, who follows the hunter as a second forerunner of civilization.

Phil Sheridan. Humanitarian. Conservationist. Animal lover. Yankee style.

J E B (Jeb) Stuart (Confederate General):¹⁵

James Ewell Brown Stuart loved danger, women, horses, racing, and the sound of a banjo. He kept his prayer book and a banjo player close by throughout the Civil War. He was the perfect image of a Confederate, and the ultimate Virginia cavalier. He was a fascinating mix of his mother's piety and his father's charm. Some saw him as the 19th-century version of a knight from the Middle Ages. The knightly ideal and the books of Sir Walter Scott were very much a part of Southern culture, but few men took it as far as did Jeb Stuart, with his plumed hat, scarlet cloak, thigh-high riding boots, and courtly manners (which Southern women loved). He didn't quite fit the mold in one respect. He promised his mother (at age 12) that he would never drink alcohol, and he never did. He let it be known that, even if he were wounded, he did not want any medicinal alcohol.

For the most part, Jeb Stuart knew how to make friends and influence people. There did come a time in the war, however, when his star didn't shine quite so brightly. As the prospects for Southern victory faded, his cavalry troops became worn down, replacements became harder and harder to come by, and the death toll mounted, the man who was once seen as gallant, courageous, and dashing seemed more reckless, shallow, vain, immature, and self-centered.

At one point Stuart let Gen Robert E Lee down badly. Generals are given assignments in general (sorry) terms, and they have a great deal of discretion in deciding exactly what to do to achieve their mission(s), how to do it, and to some extent, when to do it. But even with that much autonomy, Lee depended on Stuart to keep him informed of his own activities and that of enemy forces. Stuart failed in that responsibility after Gettysburg.

¹⁵ CWC, p308-318

But Stuart never lost the confidence of his men. Lee never lost confidence in Stuart, either, and Lee knew when to forgive and forget. After all, anyone who knew Stuart at all knew quite well that such shortcomings were simply part of his nature. He had racked up his share of demerits at West Point, and he may well have intentionally kept his class standing rather low (he graduated 13th in his class) to assure he would be assigned to the cavalry rather than the engineers. He was a fun-loving free spirit.

Not that he wasn't also a serious and effective military commander. Confederate Gen Joseph E Johnston said of him:

He is a rare man, wonderfully endowed by nature with the qualities necessary for an officer of light cavalry. Calm, firm, acute, active, enterprising, I know of no one more competent than he to estimate the occurrences before him at their true value. If you add a real brigade of cavalry to this army, you can find no better brigadier general to command it.

Twice Stuart and his men rode completely around Union Gen McClellan's troops, elevating the prominence of Stuart's Confederates and humiliating McClellan. That's the kind of adventure Stuart lived for, eagerly embracing danger with great care and skill, and having a heck of a lot of fun in the process. It was less enjoyable once when he got half his beloved mustache shot off, but he and his men no doubt had a good laugh over that, too.

Like most other prominent Confederates, Stuart accepted slavery as part of Southern life, and he had a sympathetic, paternalistic attitude toward blacks. Once he and his men got news that Yankees had stopped at a Virginia plantation and helped themselves to a black man's watch. (So much for the compassionate, black-loving, slave liberating Yankees of CivilGate myth.) Stuart's men chased down the Yankees and demanded they return the watch, which they did. (It was returned to its owner). The Yankees were

assured that it was only because the women at the plantation had said the Yankees had not harmed them that the thieves were not already hanging from nearby pine trees.

By way of contrast, while Yankees like Sherman were busy killing Southern women, old men, children, and blacks, Southern gentlemen like Stuart would never have done such a thing to civilians in the North. In one battle, Stuart's men had an opportunity to take a buffalo robe away from Yankee troops. The cavaliers would love to have gotten their hands on such a war trophy, and the only thing standing in their way was a dog. No one wanted to shoot the dog. Stuart's men cared about animals more than they cared about war trophies. In fact, Confederates cared more about Yankee animals than Yankees cared about Southern civilians.

One of Stuart's colonel's scolded the general: **Men behind stumps and fences are being killed, and here you are out in the open.** To which Stuart replied, laughing, **I don't reckon there is any danger.** His bugler once said to Stuart: **General, I believe you love bullets.** The reply: **No, Fred, I don't love 'em any more than you do. I go where they are because it's my duty. I don't expect to survive this war.** He was, as usual, accurate in his assessment.

Stuart was hit by a .44 caliber bullet from the gun of a retreating Union private. He knew right away it was a mortal wound, but, gallant to the end, he still managed to rally his men and give instructions and advice to his replacement. He died the following night.

George Armstrong Custer (Union General)¹⁶

His West Point classmates called him Fanny. Not because he had a big butt, but because he had girly golden curls. He was the class clown, and everyone loved him for it. He, for example, asked his Spanish teacher how to say “class dismissed” in Spanish. When the teacher answered, Custer and the rest of the class walked out, laughing.

He rarely studied, and he graduated last in his class. He had a heck of a lot of fun along the way, and to Custer, that was the most important objective. He racked up the demerits, and he finished his West Point career with a nice court-martial. So, quite naturally, in Yankee logic, he became a general at the age of 23.

When he had to choose which side to fight for, he figured he was obligated to fight for the North, simply because of his oath of allegiance to the United States, taken at West Point. Had he bothered to read something besides Southern chivalric romances, he might have noticed that there was nothing in COTUS prohibiting secession, and that it was, therefore, Union officers who were violating their oaths of office to uphold COTUS. Still, I give Fanny credit for basing his decision on something other than simply his own perceived omniscience and omnipotence.

He had no problem with States’ Rights, he had no interest in abolishing slavery, and unlike his fellow Union officers, he had no desire to abolish Southern culture. Had he given it much thought, he surely would have been forced to reconsider his decision. (But then, Union officers were not deep thinkers).

For example, Custer’s uniform included a crimson tie, a broad-brimmed black hat, and a black velvet jacket with gold braid.¹⁷ He wanted his men to be able to easily spot their

¹⁶ CWC, p318-327

¹⁷ CEC, p321

general on the battle field. No doubt Southern snipers appreciated that sort of Yankee logic.

After the war Fanny managed to chalk up another court-martial and a one-year suspension. Of course, he went on to gain immortality in Custer's Last Stand at the Battle of Little Big Horn. No one seems to know for sure exactly how that went down. But the important point, to me, is this: it's amazing he survived that long.

Alexander Stephens (Confederate Vice-President under Jefferson Davis):¹⁸

Our new government is founded . . . its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition.

This sentiment clearly did not represent the thinking of the vast majority of Southern leaders, as shown above. It did, however, correspond to the sentiments of many Union leaders, as shown above.

Accordingly, it was a source of great embarrassment to the Confederacy, and Stephens was soundly ridiculed by the South for saying it. On the other hand, few people took Stephens' words very seriously. Vice Presidents, after all, are notorious for saying stupid things, and for little else.

¹⁸ CWC, p9

[Richard Taylor](#) (Confederate General, son of President Zachary Taylor):¹⁹

The people of the Confederacy struggled in all honorable ways, and for what? For their slaves? Regret for their loss has neither been felt nor expressed. But they have striven for . . . the privilege of exercising some influence in their own government. Yet we fought for nothing but slavery, says the world, and the late vice-president of the Confederacy, Mr Alexander Stephens, reechoes the cry, declaring that it was the corner-stone of his government.

In other words, it was ridiculous for the North to say that Southerners fought for slavery instead of self-government, and it was especially ridiculous for the Confederacy's own VP to echo that lie.

By the way, that self-government (the Confederate Constitution, which was a slightly modified version of COTUS) guaranteed the right to slavery, just as the *Dred Scott* case had done for the Union, but it banned the importation of slaves. The South fought for slavery? Why, then, did their own constitution prohibit the slave trade? And why would they go to war to protect something that had already been guaranteed by SCOTUS and by AL himself? That's why that argument is so ridiculous, especially for Stephens.

¹⁹ CWC, p11-12